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POLITICAL PARTIES’ ELECTORAL STRATEGIES 
IN THE CONTEXT OF POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY
Abstract
Taking part in an election, political parties implement their planned stra­
tegic activities, which involve making choices regarding competitive goals and 
maximizing the usefulness o f the resources they have. A significant context 
o f party strategies is political uncertainty. The paper discusses the importance 
o f political uncertainty in three areas. First, political uncertainty is an instru­
ment affecting the character o f political competition. In the second area, the 
article presents its role as a factor o f competition in the process o f campaigning 
for votes. It also points out that political uncertainty may be a mechanism o f 
institutionalizing new political parties. Some o f the implemented party strate­
gies, influencing the level o f political uncertainty, assume possible electoral 
manipulations.
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Introduction
Political parties use various strategies when acting in a planned way 
to achieve the assumed goals. This strategy is broadly understood as a way 
to prepare and implement political offers which allow to obtain a certain elec­
torate in order to win as many public offices as possible in the current social, 
cultural, political and economic conditions [Wiszniowski 2000: 76], The basic 
dimension o f a strategy involves the voter as the factor that determines plan­
ning activities and logistics o f electoral campaigns. In this context, the voter’s 
behaviors are analyzed and the electorate is divided into segments. Then certain 
m essages are form ulated for each segment w ith the use o f  comm unication
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channels. Currently, individualized messages are mainly directed to selected 
segments through mass media. All these actions are based on the results o f 
marketing studies and surveys [Newman 1994: 38],
Parties implement many different types o f strategy. The most important 
are programme, electoral, marketing, communication and personal strategies. 
Some approaches also treat all the actions carried out by parties as elements of 
electoral strategies. In this case, personal, financial, communication, relationship 
and programme strategies are their components [Skrzypinski 2002], However, 
all o f them need to be market-oriented, assuming the effective use o f the possessed 
resources in order to achieve the assumed results. This is done by means of inten­
tional changes to the environment, especially in the fields that are critical for the 
party. Such changes are to improve the competitive position o f the party with 
regard to other entities also competing on the political market. One o f the factors 
influencing party strategies is political uncertainty. Changes in the level o f uncer­
tainty may strengthen or weaken the market position of the party.
The article presents the impact o f changes in the level o f political uncer­
tainty on the electoral strategies used by political parties. Several hypotheses are 
verified in the paper. The main hypothesis H I assumes that parties can influence 
the level o f political uncertainty to achieve their strategic goals. Hypothesis H2 
verifies the two basic components o f political uncertainty: the institutional one 
and the communication one. Hypothesis H3 describes the potential role o f insti­
tutional uncertainty. In hypothesis H4, the role o f the communication compo­
nent is assumed.
Political uncertainty
The concept o f impact o f political uncertainty on the democratic nature 
o f electoral choice refers to the phenomenon o f uncertain result o f  the elec­
tion, and especially to the management o f its dynamics in the electoral process. 
The uncertainty o f election result may have an impact e.g. on the very outcome 
o f the election, on participation in elections, or on the ultimate decisions taken. 
Scholars identify two basic sources o f uncertainty o f the result o f  electoral 
competition [Fowler, Smirnov 2007], The first o f  them refers to uncertainty 
related to voters’ behaviour and motivations determining their decision o f parti­
cipating in the election and choosing a particular party or candidate. The number 
o f factors affecting the electoral decision, their character and subjective grada­
tion of motivations o f an individual voter allow to identify individualized uncer­
tainty o f a single voter’s decision and the uncertainty o f whole segments o f the 
electoral market. The other type o f source o f uncertainty originates from the 
assumption that voters do not have appropriate resources to assess candidates’
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or political parties’ positions or that the perception o f these positions may 
not be accurate. It results from activities o f the candidates themselves, who 
“blur” the electoral message in order to increase the probability o f their victory. 
In this case, decisions are taken on the basis o f ideas and beliefs instead o f 
rational knowledge [Westholm 1997],
Andreas Schedler [2013] treats political uncertainty as the basic para­
meter moderating electoral processes but he also sees it as an object o f compe­
tition betw een political forces, who want to increase or decrease its level. 
The basic dimensions o f political uncertainty are communication and institu­
tional issues. Usually they are closely interrelated, having a synergistic effect on 
the subjects interested in changing the level o f uncertainty. The basic assump­
tion o f communication uncertainty is the statement o f a positive correlation 
betw een the pluralism  o f  available inform ation and the choice m ade w ith 
the use o f this information. Hence, the temporal area in which communica­
tion uncertainty functions is the present time, as the image o f reality providing 
the voters with the basis for their decisions is shaped in the presence. Political 
forces operating in the conditions o f reducing information uncertainty focus 
on shaping the information environment which enables intentional selection of 
messages to create the expected attitudes and make choices in the conditions 
o f imperfect access to information. In the opposite situation, when informa­
tion uncertainty is the goal, the subjects o f electoral competition tend to gene­
rate strategies which enable them to control increasing perception on the part 
o f the recipients, the media compete to look for voters and reach them, and to 
ensure them free access to information. Contrary to communication uncertainty, 
the institutional dimension concentrates on the future, aiming at designing the 
institutional form o f the political system which will make it possible to affect 
(increase or decrease) its level. Looking for the sources o f reducing institu­
tional uncertainty, we can identify the reactions which may serve as a protec­
tion from the increasing risk o f uncertainty or creating and articulating expec­
tations regarding its reduction. A classic mechanism o f reducing institutional 
uncertainty is directional changes o f political competition rules at the electoral 
level. By assumption, they reduce the chances o f entities against which they are 
directed and as a consequence increase the perspectives o f the originators o f the 
changes. A classic example o f that is changes of the electoral system, resulting 
from the existing system o f political forces in the Parliament and the govern­
ment. They make political parties promote the institutional models and proce­
dures which give them chances to consolidate or increase their relative strength 
[Colomer 2004], Protective responses to institutional threats result from iden­
tification o f negative consequences o f the high level o f political uncertainty. 
An example o f such mechanisms is the desire to reduce the effective number
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o f parties at the parliamentary level, treated as a panacea for high instability 
o f governments generated as a result o f elections. Opposite strategies, basing 
on attempts to increase the level o f uncertainty, refer to the need to change 
the existing system o f relations, and particularly to the possible alternation of 
power. Growing institutional uncertainty will in most cases serve against the 
ruling group, making it more probable for the political chances o f the opposition 
parties to grow. A possible institutional factor o f uncertainty growth is the reduc­
tion of institutional control o f the formation and activity o f political parties, also 
as regards formal requirements which condition running for election. A classic 
factor o f increasing the degree of uncertainty in this case is the reduction or total 
elimination o f financing party activity from public sources, whose existence 
promotes political parties with a high level o f institutionalization.
G enerally, the im plem entation o f  a strategy by the ru ling  parties 
should be based on the reduction o f uncertainty level. However, in the case 
o f institutional uncertainty, this conclusion is only partly true. Indeed, when 
treating institutional infrastructure as an environment in which decisions are 
made, it should ensure the conditions in which clear rules make the chosen acti­
vities and solutions transparent. It is achieved by procedures described in detail 
and implemented, which are verified and controlled at each stage. The respon­
sibility for decision making is personal in nature and usually dispersed, which 
helps eliminate individual discretionary decisions. Collegiality is not a sine qua 
non for pragmatism in decision making, but its individual character may poten­
tially lead to an increased possibility o f influence other than concerning the 
substance. It is especially important in the case o f evolution o f the political 
leadership model towards the relational model, pointing out the significance of 
uncertainty level for the generated support [Turska-Kawa 2013],
The determinant that questions the absolute necessity to directionally 
lower the level o f institutional uncertainty is the availability o f the decision 
making process for the entities which participate in it. Excessive complication 
o f decision making procedures or high cost o f participation in political compe­
tition may reduce the actual competitiveness o f the implemented strategy. It is 
similar if  too high formal criteria -  whose meeting is conditional for the availabi­
lity o f the offer -  are established. The essence of activity in this case is to ensure 
the minimum level o f institutional uncertainty above which competitiveness is 
reduced. This issue is important from the procedural point o f view, as the decision 
making entities often create unjustified barriers for the availability o f the offer, 
motivating that with the need to ensure the appropriate quality o f the decisions.
An im portant elem ent o f  influence o f  institutional uncertainty is to 
ensure the control o f decision making. The decisions m ust not be arbitrary, 
since that would limit the competitiveness o f political competition. Control
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activities include on-going control and post control. In the first case, the acti­
vities depend on the current legal conditions, involving the right to question 
the unfavorable verdict. Then, ensuring uncertainty also involves ensuring 
the procedure o f appeal to a body other than the one that issued the original 
decision. Post controls are to analyze the procedural character o f the decision 
making process and do not affect directly the decisions already made. Their goal 
is not only to optimize the observance o f norms but also to create a plane o f 
influencing the decision making bodies. In this case, performing the adaptation 
function also plays a role: post control may lead to a future change o f mecha­
nisms o f activity and modification o f the implemented strategies.
The other d im ension o f  uncertain ty  is com m unication solutions. 
The im pact o f  com m unication uncertainty is rather oriented at the current 
matters. Their possible changes affect the entities which participate in political 
competition much more quickly than do the changes o f institutional uncerta­
inty. The effectiveness and provisional character o f influencing communication 
uncertainty mean that it is used much more frequently than changes o f insti­
tutional uncertainty. The specific way o f implementing strategies means that 
in some cases the change o f comm unication surroundings is more effective 
from the temporal point o f view than the change o f the institutional dimension. 
This relation may contribute to identifying the risk o f reduced competitive­
ness. It happens when there is intensive activity addressed at the voters, aimed 
at changing the existing level o f communication uncertainty.
Decision makers may influence the communication environment by direc­
tionally affecting the chances o f entities interested in the outcome. This is much 
more often achieved by reducing communication uncertainty. Decision makers 
may purposefully fail to provide all the information or make the access to it 
difficult, and they may diversify the range o f available information for indivi­
dual stakeholders. The lack o f full access to information may lead to differences 
in the chances o f entities participating in the process o f electoral competition. 
The parties that are strongly rooted in public awareness are the beneficiaries 
o f such strategies. Access to information may be reduced by creating formal 
and material barriers or by managing the process in a way that creates a deter­
ministic market o f available information. Such a market should comply with 
certain norms but should not be competitive in terms o f availability. The range 
o f available information is usually diversified by formal means. A considerable 
share o f informal information in the ongoing proceedings clearly indicates that 
the level o f information uncertainty has been reduced.
A negative impact o f increasing communication uncertainty is a rela­
tively rare phenomenon. It results from the assum ption that increasing the 
level o f communication uncertainty ensures the conditions o f better access to
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information and consequently helps lower the risk o f acting in the conditions 
o f having incomplete information. However, in this case it is worth mentioning 
the possible range o f reception on the part o f information recipients, which 
differs from entity to entity but is always limited. A negative consequence of 
growing communication uncertainty may be a situation when the amount o f 
available information is disproportionately high in relation to the reception 
capacity o f the recipients. This may cause a temptation for the decision makers 
to generate so much insignificant information that it will exceed the recipients’ 
ability to process it and as a result make the decision making more discretio­
nary. In the critical situation, when the mass media favor one o f the entities, 
that entity may fail to inform others o f the criteria for dividing important from 
unimportant information.
Influence o f uncertainty on political competition
In contemporary democracies, political com petition occurs on three 
main arenas: electoral, parliamentary and cabinet ones. On the electoral arena, 
the basic element o f political competition involves the fight for voters’ support 
for candidates, social movements, and political parties. Phillipe Schmitter [2001] 
emphasizes that political parties are the best to aggregate social interest in the 
sphere o f politics and create platforms of civic engagement in political processes, 
and competition between parties is the most reliable mechanism o f ensuring 
rulers’ responsibility. Also, collaboration between political parties is very often 
the only possible way o f forming governments. They compete for support, 
presenting real or apparently alternative programme solutions providing the basis 
for the process o f political identification and, as a result, structuring the party 
system. Political identification on the electoral arena may be based on the same 
positions o f the voter and the party preferred by that voter in the area of political 
competition, on the voter’s group affiliation and the related preferences to vote 
for particular parties, and on party identification in which electoral decisions are 
made on the basis of permanent, symbiotic attitude to the political parties compe­
ting within it, which initiates processes o f partisan loyalty.
Robert Wiszniowski [2008] observes that political parties are national 
“organisms” and that is why the state level determines their programmes and 
strategies, and as a result, behaviors in the political space. The impact o f uncer­
tainty on strategies applied by political parties can be discussed from three basic 
perspectives: (1) as an instrument influencing the level o f political competition; 
(2) as a factor o f competition among entities fighting for votes; (3) as a mecha­
nism o f promoting new political parties. The possibility o f influencing the level 
o f political competition is fundamental for designing the strategies o f political
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parties’ activity. By conditioning the possible impact on the level o f communi­
cation or institutional uncertainty, we can try to achieve their mutual relation 
that will influence the possibility o f success. In order to consciously influence 
the described relation, we need to know the direction o f influence on communi­
cation and institutional uncertainty. Taking into consideration the wide spectrum 
o f factors affecting political competition, activities either increasing or decre­
asing the level o f uncertainty are possible in this case. The general tendency in 
this field, however, assumes the occurrence of stable, high levels o f institutional 
and communication uncertainty. This will allow the political market to develop 
in accordance with voters’ real preferences.
Analyzing the impact o f uncertainty as a factor o f political competition, 
we need to divide the entities into the ones that will be interested in increasing 
its level, and the ones that will desire it to decrease. The former include the 
entities whose goal is to achieve the highest possible level o f usefulness o f the 
electoral decisions made. These are e.g. bodies which supervise and control 
electoral competition. Reducing the level o f uncertainty, in turn, will be good for 
those whose individual interests are connected with benefiting from a low level 
o f uncertainty. Such activities may increase the risk of political manipulations.
Table 1. Actions increasing the risk o f political manipulations
Institutional decision makers Political parties
Communication
uncertainty Increase or decrease Increase or decrease
Institutional uncertainty Decrease Decrease
Sources: Own study.
Regulating the level o f uncertainty may serve as a mechanism promo­
ting the formation o f new political parties. In this case, increasing the level of 
uncertainty may determine the formation o f conditions that will promote new 
political movements. The opposite situation, in which political uncertainty is 
reduced, promotes the petrification o f the existing system o f dependencies in 
the party system structure. Thus, in such circumstances the level o f uncertainty 
will be a kind o f protection against excessive instability of the sphere o f politics.
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Conclusions
W hen designing and carrying out their electoral strategies, political 
parties often fail to realize that their activities will have an impact on political 
uncertainty level. This paradox results from the fact that unlike in the case 
o f risk, the degree o f uncertainty cannot be estimated, and hence its change 
cannot be measured either. The direction o f the change can be determined, but 
its potential dimension cannot. That is why influencing the level o f political 
uncertainty is not the basic goal o f political parties.
A strategic goal o f  political parties w ith a stable institutionalization 
level is to reduce uncertainty, unless they w ant to decompose the existing 
system o f reference. Stabilizing the level o f uncertainty is also an important 
goal for the ruling parties, since in such conditions they can perform  their 
appointment functions more easily. Through the described activities, they do 
not create the proper conditions for opposition parties to gain significance, 
either. These parties should be in favor o f increasing the level o f uncertainty, 
because in such conditions the probability o f changing the direction o f voters’ 
support grows.
Increasing the level o f political uncertainty is especially important for 
new political parties and for those that want to increase their relevance. It is 
improbable that in the conditions o f stable or decreasing political uncertainty 
the environment will be in favor o f new political movements. Increasing uncer­
tainty affects voters in two ways beneficial for new movements. The first is to 
activate new groups o f voters who were not stimulated to get involved in poli­
tics before (in a stable system o f reference). In the other case, transitions in 
electoral support occur, and their natural beneficiaries are new political parties.
Taking into consideration the impact on political uncertainty, political 
parties implement four fundamental electoral strategies to adjust to the dyna­
mically changing preferences o f voters. They can be illustrated with proposals 
by Michael Laver [2005], describing political parties’ adaptational strategies. 
The first o f them refers to the aggregator, assuming continuous adaptation o f 
party policy to the position o f its average voter and following the changes in the 
electorate. In this case, the strategy aims at the stabilization (or reduction) o f 
institutional uncertainty and reduction o f communication uncertainty. The stra­
tegy o f the “predator” is based on repeating activities that have brought the 
party the best results before (giving it electoral support higher than average). 
Such activity will surely be based on stabilizing the levels o f both kinds o f 
uncertainty. The “predator” adapts its activity to the place taken by the largest 
part o f its electorate (or the largest political party), assuming that more voters 
can be found there. So as to achieve that, political parties not only have to
58
Political Parties' Electoral Strategies in the Context of Political Uncertainty
m aintain stable institutional uncertainty but they have to reduce the level o f 
communication uncertainty as well. The last type of party strategies involves 
focusing on a permanent political message and hoping that the voters will appre­
ciate that. The implementation o f this strategy requires the reduction o f both 
institutional and communication uncertainty.
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